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Abstract: Humanity’s eforts to transmute lead into gold have impelled civiliza-
tions. Our eforts to transmute human experience into objective laws have en-
joyed similar success. Trough thinkers such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, William 
James, Felix S. Cohen, Carol E. Cleland, Russell K. Standish and Christopher A. 
Fuchs we can see that a source of the difculty in understanding phenomena via 
objective laws is that the law can best be understood as a quantum system, not a 
classical one. Law resembles a quantum system because maximal legal informa-
tion is not complete and cannot be completed.
In an efort to rid legal writing of nonsensical thinking, the great scholar and bureaucrat Felix S. 
Cohen1 recounts the heavenly dream of a 19th century German jurist who sought to understand the 
law with perfect precision:
Here were all the logical instruments needed to manipulate and transform these 
legal concepts and thus to create and to solve the most beautiful of legal problems. 
Here one found a dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an 
indefnite number of meanings out of any text or statute, an apparatus for 
constructing fctions, and a hair-spliting machine that could divide a single hair 
into 999,999 equal parts and, when operated by the most expert jurists, could split 
each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts.2 
Before we split legal hairs, however, it’s best to have an idea of just what it is we are spliting. What 
constitutes the law? Oliver Wendell Holmes asked this question almost 120 years ago in a speech 
that became one of the most famous law review articles of all time.3 
Even today the answer is not obvious. For example, Merriam-Webster’s frst defnition of law states 
that it is “a binding custom or practice of a community: a rule of conduct or action prescribed or 
formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority.”4 Te defnition is ambiguous 
as to whether law exists because a “controlling authority” (?) proclaims it or because the authority 
1 Justice Holmes is not the only intellectual luminary who served as a career federal ofcial. 
2 F.  S. Cohen, “Transcendental nonsense and the functional approach.” Columbia Law Review 35, no. 6 (1935): 809-
849, p. 809 quoting Von Jhering, “Im Juristischen Begrifshimmel,” in Sciierz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (11th ed. 
1912) 245.
3 O. W. Holmes, “Address, Te Path of the Law.” Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1897): 457-469.
4 Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, “Defnition of Law.” Retrieved from, htps://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/law.
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recognizes it as existing. In the alternative, law may exist because it is enforced.5 All of which 
leaves unclear what law is and through what mechanism its force is exerted.
Felix Cohen discusses the difculties in defning law and points to Holmes as providing the frst 
useful defnition.6 Holmes begins by distinguishing law from right and wrong, explaining “[y]ou 
can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an 
encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the 
distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is 
believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being 
made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.”7 
“Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law?” Holmes asks. If “we take the view of 
our friend the bad man we shall fnd that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, 
but that he does want to know what the Massachusets or English courts are likely to do in fact. I 
am much of this mind. Te prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”8 
Holmes is defning the law as a prophesy—a prediction—about the outcome of an experiment, 
whether or not the experimenter’s action in a given situation would result in judicial punishment. 
Under Holmes’s defnition, law exists as a subjective probability inferred in a given situation from 
each person’s experiences and nothing more.  
Holmes’s defnition provides his ontological understanding of law. In Holmes’s view, law does not 
exist because it is proclaimed, recognized, or enforced but rather law exists because bad people 
expect it to be enforced. 
Because each Holmesian legal experiment is a unique event, the defnition does not lend itself to 
developing hypotheses that can be tested by third parties. On one hand, this suggests that Holmes’s 
defnition of law isn’t scientifc, at least in a modern sense in which science is characterized by 
experimental results that can be reproduced by third parties.9  On the other hand, Holmes warns us 
that “fashion is potent in science as well as elsewhere.”10 
Te philosopher Carol E. Cleland explains that “historical sciences” such as archaeology and 
paleontology are not epistemically inferior to experimental research in which hypotheses can be 
tested through controlled experiments.11 Instead, “both ultimately infer causes from efects.” 
5 See, Henry County Sherif’s Ofce (McDonough, Georgia), “A Brief History of the Ofce of Sherif.”  And, J. Kle-
infeld, “Enforcement and the Concept of Law,” 121 Yale L.J. Online 293 (2011).
6 Cohen, p. 835.
7 Holmes, “Address, Te Path of the Law,” p. 459.
8 Holmes, “Address, Te Path of the Law,” pp. 460-461.
9 For a scientifc discussion of reproducibility, see C. Drummond, “Replicability is not Reproducibility: Nor is it 
Good Science,” Institute for Information Technology, National Research Council Canada. For a U.S. legal discus-
sion of reproducibility, see United States Ofce of Management and Budget, “Guidelines for Ensuring and Maxi-
mizing the Qality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies,” 67 Fed. 
Reg. 36 February 22, 2002. pp. 8455-8457.
10 O. W. Holmes, “Law In Science and Science in Law.” Harv. L. Rev. 12 (1899): 443-463. p. 447.
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However “the evidential relations that they exploit are diferent and this diference refects the fact 
that events are causally connected in time in an asymmetric manner.”12 13 14 
Which leaves us where with respect to understanding what law is? Cleland suggests that the 
methodological “diferences that I have identifed could be reconstructed as inferences in 
accordance with Bayes’ theorem.”15 One possibility, therefore, is that we can understand the law as 
each person’s probabilistic expectation of being punished.
Holmes’s defnition of the law looks like what we would expect a Bayesian16 approach to law to 
look like, i.e., it is subjectively inferred from experience. Experience is, thus, the basic building 
block of Holmes’s concept of law. One beneft of accepting Holmes’s defnition of law is that we 
can then link our understanding of law to a well-established body of thought.17  
Te problem with accepting Holmes’s defnition of law is the existence of a very diferent and 
broadly accepted defnition of law. Te philosopher John Roberts informs us that philosophers 
defne the laws of nature as being distinguishable from other regularities that the universe happens 
to be conforming with by being “counterfactually robust,” which is to say that these laws would 
exist under a wide range of alternative conditions and scenarios.18 
Although Holmes and Roberts bring very diferent approaches to understanding the law to the dis-
cussion, they are diferent approaches on the same topic, notwithstanding Roberts’s use of the word 
“nature” as a modifer.”19 Holmes’s concept of law extends beyond courtrooms and remains consis-
tent with a modern understanding of science.20 It is the “remoter and more general aspects of the 
11 C. E. Cleland, “Methodological and Epistemic Diferences between Historical Science and Experimental Sci-
ence,” Philosophy of Science, 69 (September 2002) pp. 474–496. Abstract.
12 Id., pp. 494-495. 
13 Poetry has the same goal as science but pursues it via diferent means. See, J.M. Coetzee’s discussion of Bruno 
Schulz, J. M. Coetzee, Inner Workings: Literary Essays, 2000-2005. 1st American ed. New York: Viking, 2007, pp. 72-
73.
14 Cleland’s analysis provides a formalized underpinning to Holmes’s observation that “[a]ny one who thinks 
about the world as I do does not need proof that the scientifc study of any part of it has an interest which is the 
same in kind as that of any other part.” Supra note 10 at 447.
15 Id., p. 495. 
16 Bayes’ Teorem. In, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from, htp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-
theorem/. 
17 M. Strevens, Te Bayesian Approach to the Philosophy of Science. In, the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
second edition. Retrieved from htp://www.strevens.org/research/simplexuality/Bayes.pdf.
18 J. Roberts, “Laws, counterfactuals, fne-tuning and measurement.” Perimeter Institute. 20 May 2010.
19 “Nature” is a tricky term. Although nature is ofen the subject of scientifc inquiry, the term also has been used 
to mean science’s antipole. See, for example, H. C. G. Brandt, “How Far Should Our Teaching and Text-Books 
Have a Scientifc Basis?” Transactions of the Modern Language Association of America, Vol. 1 (1884 - 1885), p. 60. 
Moreover, the use of a marked term, i.e., natural science, ofen indicates that the subject is a constrained version 
of the unmarked form. See, for example, M. Haspelmath, “Against markedness (and what to replace it with),” J. 
Linguistics 42 (2006), 25–70. 
20 “Te true science of the law does not consist mainly in a theological working out of dogma or a logical develop-
ment as in mathematics, or only in a study of it as an anthropological document from the outside; an even more 
important part consists in the establishment of its postulates from within upon accurately measured social desires 
instead of tradition.” Supra note 10 at 452.
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law,” Holmes said; that “give it universal interest. It is through them that you. . . connect your sub-
ject with the universe and catch an echo of the infnite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a 
hint of the universal law.”21 
Since an experiment being reproduced by other experimenters is the mildest of counterfactual 
situations, Holmes’s defnition of law as a subjective perception can’t pass the testing process 
discussed by Roberts. It’s not surprising that the consensus understanding of what law is has 
moved past Holmes, since science has a “tradition of removing the observer from the description in 
order to guarantee objectivity.”22  
At this point we should be able to say that Holmes’s personalized defnition of law has been 
superseded by Roberts’ objectivity-based assessment process. Except that we know that the 
observer does mater and that eforts to ignore the role of the observer in the observation spawn 
the endless ontological confusion inherent in thinking that it’s possible to stand outside of 
existence. 
Te computational scientist Russell K. Standish explains that by “explicitly recognising a role for 
the observer of a system, an observer that ataches meaning to data about the system, 
contradictions that have plagued the concept of complexity can be resolved.”23 24 Standish further 
explains that “Explicitly acknowledging the role of the observer helps untangle other confused 
subject areas. ... Qantum Mechanics can also be understood as a theory of observation. Te 
success in explaining quantum mechanics, leads one to conjecture that all of physics may be 
reducible to properties of the observer.”25 
Te irreducible role of the observer was emphasized by the mathematician Bruno de Fineti, who 
developed an understanding of Bayesianism that was either pure or dogmatic, depending on 
perspective, in its rejection of objective probability.26 Te preface of the English edition of de 
Fineti’s Teory of Probability states that “PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST,”27 which refects the 
author’s view that probability exists only as a psychological state of afairs, without any 
21 O. W. Holmes, “Address, Te Path of the Law,” p. 469.
22 R. K. Standish, Te importance of the observer in science,” In Proceedings Te Two Cultures: Reconsidering the 
division between the Sciences and Humanities, UNSW, July 2005. Abstract. arXiv:physics/005080123 [physics.pop-
ph]
23 Standish, Abstract.
24 Te failure of medical science in Victorian-era England to recognize that observers atach meaning to data was 
noted by Susan Sontag in her discussion of how cancer has been linked to character, “Snow was a surgeon in the 
Cancer Hospital in London, and most of the patients he saw were poor. A typical observation: ‘Of 140 cases of 
breast-cancer, 103 gave an account of previous mental trouble, hard work, or other debilitating agency. Of 187 
uterine dito, 91 showed a similar history.’ Doctors who saw patients who led more comfortable lives made other 
observations. Te physician who treated Alexandre Dumas for cancer, G. von Schmit, published a book on cancer 
in 1871 in which he listed ‘deep and sedentary study and pursuits, the feverish and anxious agitation of public life, 
the cares of ambition, frequent paroxysms of rage, violent grief’ as ‘the principal causes’ of the disease.” Qoted 
from Samuel J. Kowal, M.D., ‘Emotions as a Cause of Cancer: 18th and 19th Century Contributions,’ Review of Psy-
choanalysis, 42, 3 (July 1955) in S. Sontag, “Illness as Metaphor,” Picadore: New York 1978. Chapter 7, Footnote 2.
25 Standish, Abstract. 
26 M. C. Galavoti, “Subjectivism, Objectivism and Objectivity in Bruno de Fineti’s Bayesianism,” Chapter, Foun-
dations of Bayesianism, Volume 24 of the Applied Logic Series, pp 161-174. See, p. 8.
27 Id., p. 8.
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corresponding physical meaning.28 In de Fineti’s world as in ours, bet-your-life (p=1) certainty 
does not equate to actuality—as batlefelds and prisons continue to demonstrate.29 Certainty is a 
state of mind, whereas actuality bites irrespective of but not independent of it. 
Complex thinking is the core of de Fineti’s concept of probability. De Fineti thought that “the 
process through which probability judgments are obtained is more complex than is supposed by the 
other interpretations of probability, which defne probability on the basis of a unique criterion.”30 
One scholar explained de Fineti’s concept of probability by stating that “for the subjectivist all 
coherent functions are admissible; far from being commited to a single rule or method, the choice 
of one particular function is seen as the result of a complex and largely context-dependent 
procedure, which necessarily involves subjective elements.”31 
De Fineti’s focus on complexity brings us back to Standish’s point that the role of the observer 
needs to be recognized in order for us to have a clear concept of complexity. All of which leaves us 
in a difcult position with respect to understanding what law is. While we can’t ignore the role of 
the observer, science has a long tradition of doing just that in a quest for objectivity. 
Fortunately, “for the subjectivist all coherent functions are admissible.” Tere is no more reason to 
assume that observer-abstracted science is the only coherent means of understanding and making 
predictions based on the laws of nature than to assume that only Greek constellations can explain 
the night sky and be used for navigation.32 
Since it would be nice to have an understanding of law that extends beyond the particularism of 
courtrooms or cosmology,33 it’s helpful that Roberts’s counterfactual testing process is applicable to 
any legal form. 
It is possible for subjective, i.e., observer-integrated, scientifc systems to produce broadly 
applicable predictions that are reproducible under counterfactual conditions. One remaining34 
example of a subjective scientifc system that sidesteps slipping into some sprawling suburb of 
solipsicity is the Inuit people’s Indigenous Knowledge (IK). IK is 
28 Id., p. 3. 
29 De Fineti’s 1931 defnition of probability as “the psychological sensation of an individual” presaged the econo-
mist John Maynard Keynes’s 1934 use of “animal spirits” to help explain temporary but systematic gaps between 
certainty and actuality that were expressed via the stock market. 
30 Galavoti, p. 10. 
31 Id., p. 10. 
32 See, M. Gantevoort, D. W. Hamacher, et al., “Reconstructing the Star Knowledge of Aboriginal Tasmanians,” 
Journal of Astronomical History and Heritage, Vol. 19(3), Preprint. 2016. arXiv:1610.0278 5 [physics.hist-ph]. P. 13, 
pp 14-16.
33 Id. Te Palawa, one of the main groups of Aboriginal Tasmanians, may have made no distinction between cos-
mology and code of conduct. Gantevoort, et al, explains that the “Palawa used the stars and clouds to determine 
when to fsh, build huts, and travel” and that “the night sky” was “a blackboard on which traditions are drawn 
with stars, retold to educate generations about moral code and law.” p. 13, p. 26. 
34 “In Tasmania, colonists who seized Aboriginal children and dashed their brains out or lined Aborigines up as 
targets for musket practice likely considered their victims less than human. . . .” In, B. Madely, “Paterns of frontier 
genocide 1803–1910: the Aboriginal Tasmanians, the Yuki of California, and the Herero of Namibia,” Journal of 
Genocide Research (2004), 6(2), June, 167–192. P. 169.
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a systematic way of thinking applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cul-
tural and spiritual systems. It includes insights based on evidence acquired through 
direct and long-term experiences and extensive and multigenerational observa-
tions, lessons and skills. It has developed over millennia and is still developing in a 
living process, including knowledge acquired today and in the future, and it is 
passed on from generation to generation.35 
Te Inuit people have developed an understanding of the laws of nature that uses experience 
instead of measurement as its fundament. Each participant in the IK process recognizes that the 
other participants also assign unique meanings to observations. For example, while modern 
observers consider the night sky at a given place and point in time to be an objective phenomenon, 
the Inuit don’t. Te archaeoastronomer Clive Ruggles explains
Traditional knowledge of the skies can be very localised, and even personal, as 
among the Inuit, for whom knowledge of celestial phenomena is “in varying de-
grees, specifc to communities, familiess... When imparting information, elders fre-
quently made it plain that they were speaking for themselves, that their opinions 
were not necessarily correct in any absolute sense, and that other elders might, 
and in probability did, have diferent views.36 
Te elders’ ability to collectively make useful predictions for their communities based on the per-
sonal observations of each elder demonstrates the communal nature of the Inuit’s scientifc process 
aka IK. IK uses the disparate perceptions among the elders as the basis for complex food security 
decisions which incorporate predictions about numerous phenomena, including weather and the 
migration paterns of various species.37 Consistent with IK’s observer-integrated approach, these 
predictions are made without sextants, barometers, or other devices used to capture and communi-
cate objective data. IK focuses on understanding how systems such as air, water, and humanity 
work in concert.38 In contrast, the observer-abstracted science embodied in the Standard Model39 
35 Inuit Circumpolar Council-Alaska. 2015. Alaskan Inuit Food Security Conceptual Framework: How to Assess 
the Arctic From an Inuit Perspective. Technical Report. Anchorage, AK, p. 15. 
36 C. Ruggles, “Indigenous Astronomies and Progress in Modern Astronomy,” In R. Norris and C. Ruggles (eds), 
Accelerating the Rate of Astronomical Discovery (Special Session 5, IAU General Assembly, August 11-14 2009, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil). Proceedings of Science, PoS(sps5)029, p. 9. [Note omited, citing J. MacDonald, Te Arctic Sky: 
Inuit astronomy, star lore, and legend, Royal Ontario Institute. Nunavit Research Institute, Toronto/Iqaluit, 1998] 
Available at arXiv:1010.48783v1[physics.hist-ph].  
37 Modern science widely accepts the value of IK. See, for example, D. Riedlinger and F. Berkes, “Contributions of 
traditional knowledge to understanding climate change in the Canadian Arctic,” Polar Record 37 (2001): 315-328 
and G. J. Laidler, “Inuit and Scientifc Perspectives on the Relationship Between Sea Ice and Climate Change: Te 
Ideal Complement?” Climatic Change October 2006, 78:407. 
38 “IK stresses the need to consider how changes within one system will impact another. For example, changes in 
sea ice coverage, thickness and timing of formation cause changes in ocean currents, intensity of storms, increase 
storm surges, distribution of marine fora and fauna, prey dynamics (shifs in food web dynamics), accessibility to 
hunting locations, and traveling and hunting safety, all of which require adjustments in hunting and processing 
strategies. Tis chain reaction also occurs within the terrestrial environment.” In, Alaskan Inuit Food Security 
Conceptual Framework: How to Assess the Arctic From an Inuit Perspective,” p. 66.
39 See, CERN, “Te Standard Model: Te Standard Model explains how the basic building blocks of mater interact, 
governed by four fundamental forces.” 
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and von Jhering’s hair-spliting machine try to identify laws at as minutely fractionated a level as 
possible.40 
IK’s integrative approach to understanding the world is refected linguistically in the Yup’ik lan-
guage, which can combine multiple types of information in a single word.41 For example, there is a 
Yup’ik name for a certain fsh, Imangaq, which is translated into English as “black fsh.”42 Te 
Yup’ik name, however, encodes more information than the English and Latin names for the fsh. 
English ordinary proper names, names that are potentially generic, such as “black fsh,” can and do 
routinely refer to a singular thought,43 i.e., a specifc type of fsh. Te ordinary proper name identi-
fes the fsh; however, it provides no additional information. Te Imangaq’s Latin name, its binomial 
nomenclature, encodes more information because it identifes the specifc type of fsh and also links 
it to related species.  
Te Yup’ik name Imangaq is more complex than binomial nomenclature in the connections that it 
references, because it connects the fsh to its environment—including humans.44 Imangaq desig-
nates a specifc type of fsh and also refers to “the education youth gain when taught how to obtain 
this fsh . . .to the type and growth of vegetation within and around the waters and the connections 
that are held throughout the environment surrounding the Imangaq.”45 
Te Arctic provides a robust laboratory for testing meteorological and oceanographic predictions. 
Testing of IK by communities across the Arctic coast46 for at least 800 years47 demonstrates that the 
Inuit are able to make useful predictions based on the laws of nature. 
Anthropogenic climate change and government regulations have provided additional and ongoing 
counterfactual robustness testing of IK, since the warming Arctic and government restrictions on 
hunting and other food security decisions have changed regularities that the region has conformed 
with for centuries.48 Te survival of the Inuit people atests to the reliability of subjective science 
40 Academia refects the same worldview by siloing knowledge into an ever increasing number of increasingly 
isolated specialties and sub-specialties.
41 Te Yup’ik language is highly complex under Standish’s principle that the “more information required to spec-
ify a system, the more complex it is.”  See Standish, Figure 1. 
42 Alaskan Inuit Food Security Conceptual Framework: How to Assess the Arctic From an Inuit Perspective,” p. 50.
43 D. Schwarz, “Using Ordinary Proper Names” (2012). 
44 In accordance with conventional wisdom, the Inuit have many words for snow, but fewer than 50. See, Inuit 
Circumpolar Council–Alaska, p. 50. 
45 Inuit Circumpolar Council–Alaska, p.50.
46 Tere are Inuit communities in the United States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and Russia. Inuit Circumpolar 
Council in Canada. “About ICC.” Retrieved from htp://www.inuitcircumpolar.com.
47 Te Inuit have migrated across the northern Arctic coast over the last 800 years, having orginated on what is 
now known as the North Slope of Alaska. Te modern Inuit people maintain “some degree of genetic continuity” 
with the Paleo-Eskimos who had previously dominated the area. See, J. Raf, et al., “Mitochondrial diversity of 
Iñupiat people from the Alaskan North Slope provides evidence for the origins of the Paleo- and Neo-Eskimo 
peoples,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Volume 157, Issue 4, August 2015. Pages 603–614. pp.1-2, 10. 
48 “For example, shifs in animal migration paterns and shifs in vegetation are occurring as a result of changes in 
temperatures, salinity levels, precipitation rates, snow coverage, soil integrity (erosion), ice coverage, etc. Such 
changes require adjustments in gathering, hunting and fshing strategies. Additionally, we face new dangers as we 
atempt to navigate through storms with increased intensity, roting ice, timing of sea and/or river ice formation 
and change in ice thickness.” Inuit Circumpolar Council–Alaska, pp. 65-66.
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for making useful collective predictions based on the laws of nature; the Arctic does not grant mul-
ligans.
Te laws of nature can be understood and navigated through an observer-integrated, counterfactu-
ally robust process.  Standish conjectures “that all of physics may be reducible to properties of the 
observer.” And to Holmes, people navigate the law by beting on the chance of not incurring net 
harm.49 Tus, in its simplest form, law can be understood as rational choice.50 
Rational choice embodies a unitary concept of  law that doesn’t support identifcation of any of the 
kaleidoscope of natural and unnatural laws that seem to govern our lives. While our defnition of 
law may seem crude, it should not be seen that way. Te physicist Erwin Schrödinger pointed out 
that when multiple systems engage with each other, “the best possible knowledge of a whole does 
not necessarily include the best possible knowledge of all its parts, even though they may be en-
tirely separate and therefore virtually capable of being ‘best possibly known,’ i.e., of possessing, 
each of them, a representative of its own.”51  
Rational choices do not always yield the desired results; there is sufcient wiggle room in the law 
that even the best decisions cannot always eliminate unexpected consequences. Te physicist 
Christopher A. Fuchs points out that Holmes uses the word “betabilitarianism” to describe “the 
idea that the world is loose at the joints, that indeterminism plays a real role in the world.”52 
Indeterminism, the gap between probability and actuality, is inherent in Holmes’s defnition of law 
as a prophesy of how courts will act, not as the actions of courts. For Justice Holmes, law exists 
only as a prediction enforced via expectation.53 
Law cannot be the same for any two participants in a system, because having a unique set of 
experiences is the most basic characteristic of being a participant. From unique experiences, each 
participant draws unique inferences. Because law is based on experience, people have the same 
knowledge of what the law is with respect to gravity and a similar knowledge of what the law is 
with respect to robbing a bank but may have diferent knowledge of what the law is with respect to 
buying a controlled substance.54 
One way of understanding how probabilities are transformed into actualities comes from a 
notebook of the physicist John Archibald Wheeler.55 Fuchs summarizes Wheeler’s idea: 
49 Cost-Beneft analysis is a well specifed process. See, OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (09/17/2003). 
50 See, G. S. Becker, “Te Economic Way of Looking at Life,” Nobel Lecture, December 9, 1992,  pp. 41-43. 
51 See Schrödinger’s 1935 discussion of entanglement in “Qantum Entanglement and Information” In, Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from, htps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-entangle/.  
52 C. A. Fuchs, “On Participatory Realism” v3, revised 28 Jun 2016, p. 10. arXiv:1601.043860v3 [quant-ph] 
53 Perhaps this is what John Archibald Wheeler meant by “law without law.”
54 An article in Time Magazine, discussing a study published in Archives in General Psychiatry based on the fed-
eral 2005 to 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health datasets, explains that “Black youth are arrested for 
drug crimes at a rate ten times higher than that of whites. But new research shows that young African Americans 
are actually less likely to use drugs and less likely to develop substance use disorders, compared to whites, Native 
Americans, Hispanics and people of mixed race.” M. Szalavitz, “Study: Whites More Likely to Abuse Drugs Tan 
Blacks,” Time, November 7, 2011. 
55 J. A. Wheeler, Notebook Entry, “Add ‘Participant’ to ‘Undecidable Propositions’ to Arrive at Physics,” 4-6 Febru-
ary 1974. Retrieved from, htps://jawarchive.fles.wordpress.com/2012/03/twa-1974.pdf. 
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Every time an act of observer-participancy occurs (every time a quantum 
measurement occurs), one of the undecidable propositions consistent with the 
system is upgraded to the status of a new axiom with truth value either TRUE or 
FALSE. In this way, the life of the universe as a whole takes on a deeply new 
character with the outcome of each quantum measurement.56 
Unwitingly or not, Wheeler was echoing the early 20th century writings of philosopher-
psychologist William James. Felix Cohen explains that James’s writings underpinned his 
understanding of “recent advances in physics” in which “modern physicists conceive space as a 
manifold of relations between physical objects or events.” Cohen’s discussion of James’s 
philosophical view echoes Fuch’s explanation of Wheeler’s quantum idea:
—few would disagree with the point of view expressed by William James when he 
says that in our investigation of any abstract concept the central question must 
be:  . . .what special diferences would come into the world if it were true or 
false?”57 
Te act of observer-participancy—the participator assigning true or false values to mathematically 
undecidable propositions—constitutes experience, which is Holmes’s building block of law. As 
experience fows,58 a participant’s probability estimates are updated and law is defned anew.59
James uses the phrase “pure experience” to mean something very much like the experience that 
Wheeler conceives of for his “participator,” who “assigns true-false values. . . at his own free will” to 
the “complex of undecidable propositions of mathematical logic. . . .” James explains that 
‘Pure experience’ is the name which I gave to the immediate fux of life which 
furnishes the material to our later refection with its conceptual categories. Only 
new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may 
be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not 
yet any defnite what, tho’ ready to be all sorts of whats; full both of oneness and 
of manyness, but in respects that don’t appear; changing throughout, yet so con-
fusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of 
identity, can be caught.60
If we substitute experience for quantum measurement, Wheeler’s idea can be thought of as a 
dynamic version of Holmes’s defnition of law; every time experience occurs, law is updated. 
Wheeler sums up his view with the statement “No participator, no world!”61 Tis can be restated as 
56 C. A. Fuchs, “On Participatory Realism” v3, revised 28 Jun 2016, p. 9. arXiv:161.043860v3 [quant-ph] 
57 F. S. Cohen, p. 827.
58 “When the refective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the fowing process.” 
W. James, “Te Ting and Its Relations,” P. 29. 
59 Tere is experimental data which suggests that even constants may not constantly be constant. See, Max 
Planck Institute for Astrophysics, Press Release, “Cosmic lenses support fnding on faster than expected expan-
sion of the Universe,” January 26, 2017. 
60 W. James, “Te Ting and Its Relations,” p.  Pages 29-41. 
61 Id., J. A. Wheeler, Notebook Entry, p. 2. 
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“no participator, no law,” which is inherent in Holmes’s defnition of law as the participator’s 
prophesy.
Te updating of the law means that there is in an ongoing fow of updated possibilities for the 
participator to choose from. Reality is fertile. When we interact with it we create new reality. Fuchs 
uses the term “participatory realism” to describe how “the world is so wired that our actions as 
active agents actually mater. Our actions and their consequences are not eliminable 
epiphenomena.”62 
Fuchs is an expounder of an understanding of quantum mechanics63 that is particularly useful for 
explaining how the world works: 
I think the greatest lesson quantum theory holds for us is that when two pieces of 
the world come together, they give birth. [Bring two fsts together and then open 
them to imply an explosion.] Tey give birth to FACTS in a way not so unlike the 
romantic notion of parenthood: that a child is more than the sum total of her 
parents, an entity unto herself with untold potential for reshaping the world. Add 
a new piece to a puzzle not to its beginning or end or edges, but somewhere deep 
in its middle and all the extant pieces must be rejiggled or recut to make a new, 
but diferent, whole. Tat is the great lesson.”64 
Wheeler’s and Fuchs’s ideas were about the quantum world, not the classical one. Te physicist 
Carlton M. Caves, the mathematician Rüdiger Schack, and Fuchs explain, however, that the 
diference between the classical and quantum worlds is that in “the classical world, maximal 
information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing defnite answers for all 
possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is 
not complete and cannot be completed.”65 
By this defnition, law is quantum. Law exists only as an imperfect prediction; maximal information  
is not complete and cannot be completed. Holmes concluded that “it ofen is a merit of an ideal to be 
unatainable. Its being so keeps forever before us something more to be done, and saves us from the 
ennui of a monotonous perfection.”66 
What constitutes the law? Probabilities. Nothing more. Law is not determinative, although it is 
highly suggestive, and beting against it is the defnition of irrationality. Surprises result from 
participating in a system that bends behind personal perspective, not from incoherent functions. 
Tere is no randomness. Instead, surprise is the system’s integrity function. Law is a gambling plan 
that cannot be gamed.
Our Holmesian-Bayesian-de Finetian-Beckerian-Wheelerian defnition of law is useful because it al-
lows us to explain an ancient paradox—the long-held public understanding that there is one law for 
62 C. A. Fuchs, “On Participatory Realism,” p. 11. 
63 QBism, née, Qantum Baysienism. 
64 C. A. Fuchs, “On Participatory Realism,” p. 9. 
65 C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs and R. Schack, “Qantum Probabilities as Bayesian Probabilities,"
Phys. Rev. A 65, 0220305 (2002). Abstract. 
66 O. W. Holmes, “Law In Science and Science in Law.” Harv. L. Rev. 12 (1899): 443-463. p. 463.
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the rich and another for the poor, even though no such distinction appears “on the books.” A decade 
before he became Dean of Harvard Law, Roscoe Pound told the 1906 American Bar Association 
convention that despite the fact that the “Anglo-Saxon laws continually direct that justice is to be 
done equally to rich and to poor. . . .”
Even the wonderful mechanism of modern German judicial administration is said 
to be distrusted by the people on the time-worn ground that there is one law for 
the rich and another for the poor. It is obvious, therefore, that there must be some 
cause or causes inherent in all law and in all legal systems in order to produce this 
universal and invariable efect.67 
Te diferences in the law for the rich and the poor are as real, as measurable68—as binding—as the 
diferences in the law for the speeds of sound and light. Te law being diferent for rich and poor is 
neither paradox nor metaphor, it is bare metal reality. 
Law is unique to each person. Tere is a distinction, however, between cause and reason, between 
how and why. Te subjective nature of law suggests the process by which the poor are geting the 
short end of the legal stick; it neither requires nor justifes the result. Law leaves no room for 
Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. 
Fuchs notes that James recognized that human decisions infuenced a coherently ambiguous world, 
a view “that had quite the favor of the ‘many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics’—
something some of the foolhardies of today would say is uniquely implied by the quantum 
mechanical formalism.” He cites James’s words to Harvard Divinity students in 1884:
To that view, actualities seem to foat in a wider sea of possibilities from out of 
which they are chosen; and, somewhere, indeterminism says, such possibilities ex-
ist, and form a part of the truth.”69 
James’s sea is turbulent, but its possibilities are always fresh. 
67 R. Pound, Te Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 Am. Law. 445 (1906), pp. 
445-446. 
68 J. Reiman, and P. Leighton, “Te Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice, 
11th Edition,” New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2016. 
69 C. A. Fuchs, “Notes on a Paulian Idea: Foundational, Historical, Anecdotal and Forward-Looking Toughts on 
the Qantum, Selected Correspondence, 1995–2001,” 10 May 2001. arXiv:quant-ph/001050 39 p. 2. 
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